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1Beyond the Creative City –  
Cultural Policy in an age of scarcity
 
For MADE: a centre for place-making, 
Birmingham. November, 2011.  
Dr Jonathan Vickery
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies, University of Warwick
2The Creative City is not just an idea or theory, but has become a symbolic 
marker of a now defunct era of economic optimism.1 Throughout this era, 
‘creativity’ held out the promise of radical change, and was ubiquitous. The 
actual ‘Creative City’ idea emerged in strength the mid-1990s as a kind of 
avant-garde cultural policy. Framed by a growing political investment in 
urban regeneration in the UK, it aimed for its wholesale policy re-orientation 
– with the arts, public art and urban design as symbolic leaders in a new city 
‘creative turn’. The avant-garde thrust of the Creative City idea was in the 
promise of a cognitive as well as philosophical alternative to the development 
of the neo-liberal city after the collapse of modernist urban paradigms in the 
1970s. ‘Creative’ would be a way of turning art into life – a new way of 
thinking, as well as a modus operandi of policy makers, urban planners, city 
officials, and even industrialists. The artist would displace the engineer as 
the model of professional labour in the hard physical contexts of the urban 
realm.2
 Initiated by Charles Landry and Comedia in the 1980s, the Creative 
City addressed the way that art and culture in cities were by and large either 
detached or decorative. Despite the evident cultural dimension of many 
a city’s social problems, a broad conceptual understanding of culture was 
simply missing from urban policy frameworks. And despite the evident 
achievement of the arts, the arts were only ever presented as an ‘add on’, 
like the family silver or Queen’s jewels, valuable but useless and an object 
of preservation more than serious thought. The Creative City idea was 
articulated by Landry and colleagues in a policy-friendly language, with lots 
of practical tips on how policymakers can provide the strategic conditions for 
transforming urban environments. However, creativity as defined by Landry 
all too easily became just a series of policy techniques (he himself referred 
to it as a ‘toolkit’), and was not sufficiently politicized. It traded only on its 
impact value. It is my argument in this paper that ‘art and culture’ need to 
be redefined politically, as an essential dimension of city governance.3 This is 
not something that can be fully explained here, in part as the very concept 
of ‘city governance’ is an ambiguous and contested. And Moreover, we need 
to be clear what the issues are – which is what I hope to do here, through a 
recap of the recent history of cultural policy. 
 Discussions of the creative city in cultural policy circles tend to be 
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3framed by ‘urban regeneration’, the term though which almost all major 
European urban development is articulated. For us, I want us to remain with 
the concept of ‘the city’ and not ‘urban regeneration’ per se, for two reasons. 
First, ‘the city’ posits a relation between actual physically delimited territory 
and political legitimacy. Urban regeneration, rather, is a ‘scheme’ based 
mechanism, often eliding the socio-political particularity of any given urban 
expanse. Driven by so many priorities, multiple policy initiatives, stakeholders 
and vested interests, urban regeneration emerged from a confluence of civic, 
local, regional and national actors (all transfixed by the growing potential of 
transnational capital investment and global cultural tourism). For example, 
in the UK the profligate expenditure of ‘PFI’ projects [the Private Finance 
Initiative, a dimension of the ‘Private Public Partnership’ schemes initially set 
up by the Conservative administration in 1992], is only just fully coming to 
light.4 Urban regeneration then, essentially detached from the question of 
governance and the political commitments it entails, can and has generated 
a crisis of political legitimacy in urban development. 
 A second point worth making is that in the last two decades local 
authority (i.e. city council) expenditure on art and culture has far exceeded 
that of the national funding agencies and quangos (from Arts Council 
England downwards). This comes as a surprise to many, who when thinking 
of art or culture immediately refer to either the ‘art world’ (international art 
markets and art patronage) or national government funding bodies. City 
authorities are in fact the prime spenders on culture (though admittedly, 
this spending is often integral to a lot of other services, and thus is difficult 
to quantify in a comparative assessment). The role of the city in urban 
development therefore raises specific questions about the relation between 
producers (like artists), consumers (or citizens) and the policy mechanisms 
that regulate that relation. The ‘art world’ and its national sponsors are once-
removed from ‘the city’, whose economic life and intellectual discourse 
are not embedded within it – however much they benefit from its cultural 
facilities, platforms or locations. The city is the place in our cultural landscape 
where political commitment and strategic values are consolidated, and the 
function of culture in civic life registered most clearly on the richter-scale of 
public-political deliberations. Most of our major sites, facilities and platforms 
for art and culture reside within the urban policy-governed expanse of the 
city, if used by forms of art and culture which have little intrinsic political 
investment in it. 
 From the late-1980s, an otherwise disinterested artworld did find 
a measure of strategic engagement with city development through urban 
regeneration. This was consolidated in the 1990s, where the easy availability 
of capital funding fuelled a massive surge in urban ambition within city 
council sponsors and their private real estate partners. Urban regeneration 
‘partnered’ with culture, and in doing so became much more than just a 
strategic urban planning mechanism. Regeneration became a broad cultural 
framework. By capitalising on the ideological appeal of culture, it evoked 
the Victorian values of heritage and patrimony, which in turn allowed it to 
4represent its property and land re-appropriation activities as some kind of 
civic renaissance. By the end of the decade, regeneration became a broad 
philosophy of urban transformation, inspiring artists, urban designers, 
visionary architects and social entrepreneurs. It became a framework within 
which ideas were generated, design was formulated, and significant research 
was conducted: urban regeneration was a conceptual arena for rationalizing 
the function, value and benefits of a whole range of economic, social and 
cultural activities in urban space (and the relation between them). However, 
as indicated above, its lack of a specific fulcrum of political commitment 
meant that urban regeneration was sufficiently amorphous to be able to 
repeatedly mask, conceal or re-present (in politically persuasive imagery) a 
range of socially unacceptable mechanisms for the control and appropriation 
of public assets.5
 With the current decline of massive capital investment and free-flow 
cash, the urban regeneration as we know it will also decline (and already 
has, though currently we live in the nether world of contractual obligations, 
where funds committed five years ago are only now being spent). One of 
the products of the last two decades of regeneration was public art – where 
every city centre was to a greater or lesser degree host to new sculptures, 
installations, performances and cultural festivals, new monuments and 
commemorations, and large art-architecture collaborations. Each type of 
public art has its own order of value, and in our era of scarcity will fare 
differently. Revenue-raising arts, like popular performance and festivals, 
might well expand; otherwise, we will no doubt see a contraction of artistic 
activity, as well as a ‘retraction’ of artistic labour back into the established silos 
of art institutes and contemporary museums. Public art – and its inherent 
concern with a cultural public sphere – should, however, be part of any 
serious attempt to address the creative city. 
 In a recessionary framework, the relation between culture and poverty 
is theoretically interesting for reasons I will explain in the next section. 
Currently, artists – probably one of the most economically resourceful and 
adaptable of social groups – are indeed trying to find a way of ‘doing it 
cheaper’, without the patronage of capital-funded frameworks. Aside from 
the attraction of new technology, there has been a discernible shift to the 
internet and to social media as preferred cultural locations. In the city, we 
have pop-up art shops, installations in other provisional spaces, like bankrupt 
business space in city shopping centres. Many artists are of course hoping for 
a ‘capital flight’ from the spaces of retail, to an extent that echoes the post-
industrial vacation of factory space in the 1970s. However, the artist doing it 
on the cheap is not ‘the problematic’ of the post-creative city. 
 Our problematic, however, is broader – the manifest role of 
‘creativity’ in the city and its mechanisms of political reproduction. Despite 
the extent that art and culture have been involved in urban regeneration, 
both national urban and cultural policy in the UK has actually prevented the 
‘internalization’ of art within urban development. Cultural Policy-making in 
the UK has by and large taken the form of cultural economics – concerned 
5with the building of strategic mechanisms and rationales on funding art 
from national public revenue sources, predicated on the art in question 
remaining free of any local political obligation. The term ‘cultural policy’ has 
traditionally revolved around ‘the arts’ of course, and plays a double game 
of being ‘post-facto’ in the sense of functioning as mere ‘support’ for the 
good art that already exists, and yet whose power of financial patronage can 
only but be prescriptive. The actual role of national funding mechanisms in 
cultural production is still something of a mystery. Cultural policy debates 
within public policy circles largely revolve around cost-benefit ratios, which 
when fail, appeal to older philosophical (and anachronistic) concepts of the 
humanities in civil society or the general public good. ‘General public good’ 
is by its nature so diffuse it is also indefinable. 
Where’s the creative city? 
One of the animating principles of the original creative city framework was 
that the city itself was a creative product, and developing the city as a site, 
frame and platform for creativity itself required creative action – that policy 
making was meant to emerge from a creative intellectual engagement with 
the conditions and processes of cultural production. At present, after two 
decades of art commissioning and patronage, we certainly do have a lot of 
genuinely impressive creative ‘nodes’, components and events in our cities, 
many if not all are the product of policy initiatives. But do we have a creative 
city? What do we actually think of when we think of a ‘creative city’?
              
DIAGRAM 2: creative city components: 
 Many cities boast the components of a creative city, as they have 
featured in the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject 
6– from Charles Landry to Charles Leadbeater, from John Montgomery to 
Richard Florida. For Florida, in his recent book Who’s your City (2008), the 
ability to assess a city’s urban culture is now essential to planning one’s career 
trajectory! In the UK, the creative city was premised on some happy alliance 
between the notoriously philistine centre of urban command and control 
– local Town Planning – and incoming new trends in urban design (largely 
emerging from the American ‘placemaking’ tradition). However, surveying 
the available books now in the marketplace on the subject of the creative city, 
we do not find tales of success, but more often than not a cultural analysis 
of problems – problems that more often than not have arrived via the law 
of unintended consequences. Most of these books, of course, are written by 
academics (who make a living out of finding problems); nevertheless, these 
problems have a very concrete and undisputed reality. 
 These problems include gentrification and property-oriented 
development, with its social class segregation, and consequent ‘class 
cleansing’ of suburbs (family and community dispersal); add to this the 
phenomena of metropolitanisation, then commodification, where the city’s 
social mechanisms of development are redefined and redesigned according 
to generic measures of retail distribution, service industry labour efficiency 
and transportation speed. And where the city brand scheme reconstitutes the 
indigenous social identity of a place, making it a pliable object of strategic 
destination marketing, where even residents are treated like visitors. The 
lure of international capital invariably meant that every city high street was 
swiftly given over to international brands, and with the priority on luxury and 
consumer goods rather than local trade; indigenous craft or produce from 
the local economy was entirely displaced. It’s a story told many times, that 
where the creative city was meant to concern itself with ‘the city’, instead, 
creativity became a means of enabling the city to act as both platform for 
and cipher of the new global economy, whose interests are inimical to the 
long term development of existing social communities and their urban 
spaces.6 The general point is that the creative city is not sustainable, and like 
the global capital markets, will sooner or later collapse under the weight of 
its own contradictions. 
  And yet, anyone who remembers the 1970s would agree that British 
cities have radically changed for the better, and art and creativity has been a 
visible means of that change. Many a northern industrial town now celebrates 
its effaced cultural history; places like Salford or Coventry or Preston have 
excavated and reinterpreted forgotten history and memory. Culture has 
been used to galvanise community life and forge a vision for the future. 
There has been an explosion in café culture, new open spaces, local outdoor 
events, celebrations and festivals, unimaginable in the economic context of 
the 1970s. And despite the economic downside of tourism, British cities have 
been projected across the world, attracting the kind of tourists that play a 
legitimate role in developing cultural life (not just stimulating ‘Disneyfication’). 
 With some irony, perhaps, the UNESCO Creative City index only 
registers one UK ‘creative city’ – Bradford.7 (Scotland is the only country in 
7the world having two creative cities – Glasgow and Edinburgh). Bradford, 
however, is only creative on account of its investment in one single creative 
industry sector – film. Does this mean it is a creative city?8
 The city of Toronto is the most ethnically diverse and widely 
recognized creative cities in the world. In this context, the opening of its 
impressive creative city strategy is telling: It states: 
‘The Mayor’s vision of creativity as an economic engine; Richard 
Florida’s arrival in Toronto: two prominent indications of the 
importance of creativity at this moment in the city’s history. The 
components are all in place: Toronto’s wealth of human talent; its 
openness to diversity; its strong social infrastructure; the breadth 
and depth of higher education institutions; strong and safe 
neighbourhoods.And last but not least, its extraordinary strengths in 
creative and cultural industries. It is all here’. (Creative City Planning 
Framework 2008).9 
 It may all be there. However, the next paragraph begins: ‘But success 
requires political will’. The situation in the UK at present is this. Like Toronto, 
impressive ‘components’ and the facility to initiate, develop and manage 
‘components’ have been consolidated. But something to do with ‘political 
will’, or political commitment, is lacking. And ‘will’ is not a simple matter 
of intention: there are plenty of good intentions around. ‘Will’ requires a 
philosophically defensible rationale. Creativity as such is not the issue either: 
it is everywhere. The issue is the nexus between politics and policy and 
what ‘culture’ can become within that nexus. Somehow our cities do not 
have a cultural coherence, not in vision, trajectory or lifestyle, as urban-city 
development itself has not been principally generated by the kind of critical 
research that would comprehend the political nature of urban cultural life. 
Culture and Political Will
Where in France, preserving a sense of the French ‘way of life’ is a normative 
imperative for cultural policy, in the UK there is no such sense of indigenous 
aesthetic dimension to the everyday – at least, not beyond the inherently 
conservative provincial parish routines still visible around the country. One 
of the formative influences for Comedia’s creative city research was European 
cultural planning and the work of the Council of Europe from the late 1970s, 
from where the fashionable urban regeneration term ‘renaissance’ was 
derived (the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance: 1982-1986). The 
term ‘renaissance’ employed in New Labour cultural policy from around 
1999 – in the arts, urban design and planning, and museums and heritage – 
signified an attempt to reconstruct a sense of a cultural way of life.10
 The rhetoric of wholeness, reintegration, and even a sense of political 
‘healing’ pervaded New Labour’s ‘joined up’ approach to government on 
accession to power in 1997. In the foreword to the Urban White Paper11 
Our Towns and Cities (2000), John Prescott stated ‘How we live our lives is 
8shaped by where we live our lives’, inflecting a technical strategy for city 
development with New Labour polemic.12 The argument was that the urban 
regeneration of past governments was premised on property reconstruction, 
ignoring the more fundamental issues of ‘quality of life’. The term ‘quality 
of life’ followed ‘renaissance’ in policy discourse, and in the first of the 
impressive The State of English Cities reports, it expressed Tony Blair’s states 
aspiration to put public interest at the heart of city management through a 
renewed local democracy – expressing ‘a connected rather than reductionist 
view of the world’.13  
 The cities of Sofia, Marrakesh, Bangalore, are all cities of culture, 
with profound dimensions of cultural experience and a distinctive way of 
life. However, we wouldn’t call them ‘creative cities’. The historical cultural 
city, however, is still a principle focus of global cultural tourism, and signifies 
something of the mysterious sense in which a ‘way of life’ has been lost, and 
the very nostalgia for lost culture is something which in certain respects the 
creative city seeks to simulate in positive ways. And whilst the loss of singular, 
organic national cultural ‘way of life’ is of course intrinsic to industrial 
modernity per se, the historic city still generates something enigmatic, 
where the ‘loss’ of culture is made over into a positive cultural experience. 
The issue here is that this enigmatic sense of the cultural is beyond policy, 
and not simply an effect of old architecture and planning. Barcelona’s El 
Ravel perhaps expresses something of the social conditions of this historic 
urban culture, where a nebulous social anarchy pervades the area. Closer to 
home, with a more parochial example, London’s Camden Lock and its ability 
to attract 150,000 young visitors on a summer’s weekend, is not an effect of 
great architecture, art or musical events either. In fact, a quotidian set of mid-
nineteenth century waterways warehouses, through which operate a series 
of canal locks, are the context around a main attraction in the form of a local 
market. Much of the market sells unimpressive low-grade low-price domestic 
ware. Yet, Camden Lock is enigmatic. 
 Physical facilities and material environments do not in themselves 
create an enigmatic cultural dynamic. It is the way the space and place 
generates form of undirected social interaction, which is hard to define in 
policy terms (for example, it is where production and consumption are almost 
indivisible, and where outside shifts in capital are resisted, and where endless 
forms of differentiation and defamiliarisation seem possible). The social 
interaction of these spaces is as much an interaction with space as with other 
people, and is difficult to define without reference to past and dissolving 
cultural rituals, symbolic languages, states of mind, all of which are mediated 
by a profound sense of disoriented change (as El Ravel has of course changed 
in response to increased visitors and outside attention, as well as the rest of 
technological modernity). A range of parallel cultural spaces have emerged 
in many European cities over the last few decades – sometimes initiated 
by artists or squatters, sometimes private entrepreneurship, sometimes 
policy initiative – all attempting to stimulate the sociocultural enigma of 
authentic culture: Berlin (Tacheles), Grenoble (Quartier Berriat), Lausanne 
9(Flon), Marseille (Friche Belle-de-Mai), the Dortmund ‘U’, and Birmingham’s 
Custard Factory. To this can be added the recent rise in ‘artist-run’ galleries 
or arts centres. They are not one single phenomenon, but without doubt 
the rise in such spaces is a symbolic resistance against the normative cultural 
formations prescribed by established patterns of urban development. 
 These new cultural spaces are animated not by some neoprimitivist 
desire for a pre-modern unity of social collective and the environment, 
but a more critical grasp of the loss of culture in and against the cultural 
overproduction of the creative city era. These spaces did not emerge in 
response to a lack of culture, but a world where the shopping mall, university 
and city art museum had all become part of a new seamless and burgeoning 
flow of ‘creative capital’. In these spaces we find the ‘spectre of authenticity’, 
where ‘raw’, real or street level social interaction responds to the impossibility 
of ‘real’ culture (or a sense of what the term ‘real’ means in any available 
context). They all thus express a need for ‘unmanaged’ or self-managed 
life.14 This is a serious, if ignored, intellectual problem for policy. Adorno’s rail 
at the ‘overadministered society’ was not utopian: the micromanagement of 
culture can strangle the very intellectual energy it seeks to cultivate. The past 
and current policy mentality cannot tolerate the idea of cultural anarchy, 
even though what is illegal, socially degrading or ‘bad’ design often plays a 
productive role in urban-cultural reproduction. 
 The problematic we face is therefore both theoretical and practical – 
understanding the current conditions of cultural experience in and against 
the components of a creative city, which are so impressive but cannot give us 
a creative city. We don’t experience the city as a creative space, the creative 
dimensions of it are either contrived (appear and disappear without trace), 
or only involve a select group of specialists. What we still look for as valuable 
in culture is often the historically degraded, the unmanaged, the unreformed 
or even deformed, or the impossible or downright nihilistic. This does not 
mean we are looking for the right thing – we are surely not: the reflex to look 
for ‘real’ culture in the obsolete ‘historic-cultural city’ is surely symptomatic of 
a disorientation caused by the dislocation of culture from the contemporary 
urban and its political conditions. Our cities import or reproduce culture, not 
create it (and in turn are created by it). 
The Intellectual Task
Currently it seems, in the UK at least, that the growing shock of a second 
economic recession – which could last up to a decade – is helpfully exposing 
the fundamental priorities of local authorities and arts funders alike. It is also 
an opportunity for critical reflection on these priorities. Cultural activists may 
take heart in the fact that much of the pivotal moments in the history of 
modern art emerged in times of recession, depression, war or downright 
social decline. I will further our discussion by briefly considering two issues: 
1: we need to re-think the cultural politics inherent in planning and design 
principles (and their relation to the cultural development of the city); 2: we 
need to re-think our very concept of culture, and how the urban and the 
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cultural (which still largely means the arts) are related. These are big subjects, 
so here I can only offer a few thoughts.  
 1: The policy deployment of the term ‘creativity’ has further generated 
a culture of administered control, and not of freedom – creativity has been 
yet another set of techniques for generating preconceived economic ends, 
and not a way of opening up new possibilities. Moreover, the ideology of 
creativity that animated cultural and related policy fields was still grounded 
in outmoded notions of inspirational individualism, articulated through style 
and the eccentricity of the celebrity artist or architect, a phenomena so 
deconstructed by Bourdieu in the 1980s and popularised by sociologists in 
the UK through the 1990s. This, for the critics of cultural policy, has resulted 
in the pseudo-aesthetics of ‘starchitecture’ and the ‘aestheticisation’ of 
social life in our once great cities (Miles, 2007), where luxury is the norm, 
displacing vernacular creativities (Edensor, et al. 2009), and where culture 
only counts if it is instantly converted into a ‘creative industry’ (Pratt and 
Jeffcut, 2009).15 Creativity has been central to the reconstitution of labouring 
subjectivities for new hypermobile and flexible neoliberal economy, as 
defined by geographers David Harvey, Nigel Thrift and others.16 Altogether, 
the impacts of this culturalisation of the urban have not facilitated a more 
active citizenry, but rather, a further detachment of the populace from the 
mechanisms of urban development. For culture has merely become a way 
of making the city more beautiful, pleasurable and attractive – not more 
intellectually active in the cultural politics of its urban way of life.  
 The disappointing aspect of New Labour’s legacy after a period 
of almost unprecedented political power, is not that they missed an 
opportunity to re-think planning and design principles and their relation 
to cultural development. They certainly did (admittedly more with design 
than planning). The disappointment is that their policy initiatives were either 
not followed through, or were not followed with statutory obligations for 
implementation at the level of local authority. How many a local planning 
guideline referred to design principles, design quality indicators, public art 
strategy for new residential estates – all immediately obviated by ever attractive 
small print ‘get-out clauses’. This was not oversight: it was a rank political 
failing, as even at the very outset, with the Labour Party’s manifesto for the 
1997 general election, a commitment was made to radically reconfigure the 
urban environment: 
 
‘The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the 
sense of community, identity and civic pride that should define our 
country. Yet we consistently undervalue the role of the arts and culture 
in helping to create a civic society’.17
Creating a new ‘civic society’ – healing the wounds of the previous 
instrumentalism and ‘economism’ of John Major’s Conservative administration 
– was the intellectual impetus behind the urban, social and community policy 
initiatives of 1997-2002. For an early example, the then DETR’s Planning for 
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Sustainable Development: Towards a Better Practice (1998) suggested that each 
city in the UK constructed a ‘vision’ (a visualization) of how their city should 
look in 25 years time. This was not simply a request for a normative urban 
design proposal. It was an attempt at addressing the poverty of thought and 
paucity of long term planning in city life – where culture, society and the 
built environment were considered as one ‘civic’ whole – and a new horizon 
of expectation was constructed through an act of civic imagination.  
 It was just an idea. The city did emerge as a major theme for New 
Labour – with continued support for the European ‘Core Cities Initiative’, 
started in the UK in 1995, and the ‘State of the English Cities’ project, 
which since 2000 has created an enormous database and series of strategic 
studies. These both included the arts and culture as components, yet mere 
components with no sense of an intrinsic strategic role. The intellectual 
failure in integrating culture and the urban at the level of city planning 
was perhaps symbolized by the Urban Task Force’s second report, Towards 
a Strong Urban Renaissance (2005), which so obviously lamented the lack 
of political will in implementing their first report and now famous urban 
study, Towards an Urban Renaissance (1999). A masterful text book of urban 
design, the first report arguably became bogged down at implementation 
stage in the politics of urban economics, which then obfuscated the nature 
of its intellectual demands. Local authorities were not visibly inspired, and 
the agenda soon moved on from design-led ‘renaissance’ to the new eco-
economics of sustainability (which, it must be said, became surprisingly 
philistine). 
 During New Labour’s tenure, the Arts Council England continued to 
defend the ‘autonomy’ of the arts, but as this cut little ice in policy spheres, 
it invested most of its research budget into proving art’s social impact (a 
policy performance not without contradiction). The political heat was 
taken off the arts inadvertently by the work of the Government’s Creative 
Industries Task Force (CITF), who when conducting their Creative Industries 
Mapping exercises (of 1998, then 2001) slotted ‘Art and Antiques market’ 
within the matrix of the UK’s hard GDP production. Calculated revenue 
and employment rates implied that the public subsidy of the artworld was 
more of an investment than a subsidy. More important were the cognitive 
implications of subsequent policy discussions, where the arts and culture 
began to be defined in terms of the broader creative economy. Universally 
appreciated by their cousins, the designers, art directors and media producers 
in the creative industries, the arts were effectively positioned in the public 
policy mindset as a kind of ‘exploratory research’ or open source ‘R&D’. Art 
and the artist were no longer ‘for their own sake’ but a realm of blue-skies 
thinking that generated an IP-free publicly-available ‘models’ of thought, 
communication, production and business to be fruitfully appropriated by the 
design and media industries. With publications like the DEMOS sponsored The 
Independents: Britain’s new cultural entrepreneurs (by Leadbeater and Oakley), 
the tangible distinction between the artist and the business entrepreneur 
shrank; they were two sides of the same coin.18 Art could happily remain 
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the chaotic but invigorating swirl of un-implemented ideas, for it was for 
other parts of the economy to do the implementing. It was precisely art’s 
lack of concern for the world of tangible problems that stimulated its raw 
inspirational energy. New forms of contemporary art – such as ‘BritArt’ – 
added even further levels of value. Gaining an unprecedented profile in the 
international media, Britart was routinely feted by the political establishment 
for its verve and daring. In Tony Blair’s ‘Cool Britannia’ (a smug epithet that 
soon dissolved under the impact of the Millennium Dome fiasco in 2000), 
contemporary art was evidence to the international business community 
that Britain was a ‘live’ and kicking place to live, relocate, or to educate one’s 
children. Few people liked the actual products (the art) of live culture – but 
the implications were always more ideologically influential than the reality. 
Britain was a culturally great place to be.19 
 By 2005 and The Cox Review of Creativity in Business, the arts became 
an established tool in the policy mindset for creative development in all 
sectors of industry. And even though the ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ were 
viewed by Cox as coextensive, as policy fields they were heading in very 
different directions.20 Little if any integration was attempted between them, 
and continued cultural policy advocacy for the arts developed no lexicon 
of urbanism, despite the growing achievements of public art.21 European 
cultural planning models were largely rejected by local authorities, despite 
the increasing use of terms like ‘cultural infrastructure’ in city councils’ 
cultural strategies. Further intellectual development was somewhat stalled 
by a wholesale serial reproduction in policy making – a ‘xerox policies’ 
syndrome (i.e. repeating models, such as ‘clusters’ or ‘creative quarters’) – or 
a concentration of cultural resources in a fixed network of high-profile (and 
expensive) institutions (the world of public funding has its own celebrity sub-
culture). 
 Whilst most arts organizations in cities across the country were 
more than please to benefit from urban regeneration in the form of new 
facilities, design ‘make overs’, new projects or event funding, their role in 
urban development rarely venture beyond participation in routine local 
government ‘consultation’ exercises. The intellectual position of the arts 
has been fundamentally defensive and not offensive, and it’s hard to find a 
city where the arts sector maintains any form of ‘avant-garde’ impact on its 
city’s political discourses. I want to end this section with a few points about 
Charles Landry’s initial vision for the creative city, or rather, what I think the 
presuppositions of his original concept of creative city were, as these are a 
good preface for a rethinking of the role of art in a city-urban framework:22 
(i) creativity should not be primarily a matter of art, but of urban life: 
the city as a cultural product is a priority.
(ii) creativity is not a moral category – [the political aesthetics of 
fascism put paid to that idea], as creativity can be destructive as well 
as productive. 
(iii) creativity is not primarily or necessarily individualist and spontaneous 
(or about art objects or expressive style), but collective and strategic 
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(about spaces, behaviours, knowledge, vision). 
(iv) lastly – importantly – public policy was not intended to direct or 
patronise creativity, but to create the social conditions for creativity. 
Cultural production should be stimulated by the urban contexts of its 
emergence, not abstract policy ideas and their funding strategies.
 
Of course, I have ‘shoehorned’ Landry into my own argument here – yet I 
think these tenets are a defensible means of impetus for a re-think of art and 
the city. 
2: We need therefore to re-think our conception of culture, and how the 
urban and the cultural (which still largely means the arts) are related. ‘Cultural 
policy’ should be the place where ‘culture’ is understood as something 
formed through political decision-making and regimes of management we 
call ‘cultural governance’. An immediate issue is, of course, that ‘cultural 
policy’ is not a national public policy category as such: cultural policy is 
either arts policy, music policy, media policy, sport policy, and so on, all 
devolved into city-based local strategies (which is often just national policy 
writ small). Culture is atomized into genres, each possessing its own 
professional constituency and internal political dynamics. Areas of culture, 
like faith groups, do not feature on the radar of cultural sector-directed 
policy at all. Even thinking about culture on a national scale is structured by 
its aforementioned ‘positioning’ in the creative economy. In public policy 
terms, we find that we are faced with three overlapping but strategically 
distinct fields – creative, cultural and urban. Sometimes these are referred to 
as sectors, sometimes ‘economies’ in their own right. 
 
DIAGRAM 1 – the three economies
 The conceptual separation of these ‘economies’ or sectors (whatever 
the reality of their overlapping and interconnection) is a structural feature of 
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British policy making, and has implications on how we think through future 
scenarios. My suggestion is that a new macro-urban cultural policy thinking 
needs to start with the dynamic between the three economies (moving 
beyond the categorizations instituted by the DCMS ‘mapping’).
 The separation of the arts as a unique and distinct sphere may 
seem logical in the light of its ‘public’ subsidy, but it has implications for 
thinking about cultural production and the city. The role of the arts in a 
broader cultural policy framework is characterized by a caveat – the arts 
(contemporary art, etc.) by and large inhabit a cultural field and discourse 
that is transnational, and whose primary economic frame of reference is not 
any one urban environment. It is the historical-international discourse of 
contemporary art and its global art economy. New forms of ‘participatory 
art’ aside,23 contemporary art generally attains to ‘greatness’ (in the Arts 
Council’s terms) by virtue of not being embedded in the urban everyday 
through which social reproduction is mediated. The Arts Council England’s 
ongoing campaign of ‘great art for everyone’ is a last chance café, which 
rests on the premise that international contemporary art is socially relevant, 
even to ‘ordinary’ people who don’t inhabit its discourse, or have any reason 
to.24 Attempting to entice the public into the art world is not a rationally 
defensible objective (as perhaps the statistics of successive Arts Council 
‘Taking Part’ surveys indicate).25 It is one of the ironies of contemporary art 
history – that the artworks and artists who punctuate the official narratives 
of twentieth century art were invariably creatures of the market, not public 
subsidy. 
 To compound the caveat – the heavy patronage of the arts within 
national urban regeneration over the last two decades has to some degree 
masked a policy-level strategic detachment from its urban environment. 
The Arts Councils have maintained a distinctively modernist concept of 
‘autonomy’ as a policy principle (where modernist autonomy of course was 
embodied in the very principle of ‘arm’s length’ governance that was the Arts 
Council’s political modus operandi as specified in its Royal Charter). While 
in 1989 the Arts Council of Great Britain published An Urban Renaissance: 
The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration, (in part inspired by the then 
Department of Environment’s earlier ‘art and architecture’ initiatives), and 
then supported the US originated ‘Percent for Art’ scheme in British public 
sector construction, the urban realm remained marginal to their policy 
thinking throughout the 1990s up to the present (see A Creative Future: The 
Way Forward for the Arts, Crafts and Media in England).26
 It was left for the Department of Culture Media and Sport to make 
the big case for integrating art in urban contexts, with their (belated) 2004, 
Culture at the Heart of Regeneration.27 Despite the enormous development of 
public art practice by mid-2000, particularly after the high point of Millennium 
commissions, the theme of ‘regeneration’ was just one of a spectrum of Arts 
Council concerns, some would say deliberately downplayed and certainly 
overtaken by the investment of the arts in social and community services 
(see the 2006 review, the three-part The Power of Art).28 When by 2007 the 
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significance of public art and participatory art in the public realm became 
irrepressible, the Arts Council invented a new category of ‘Outdoor art’ (the 
theme of which was ‘public’ space, but the focus of which was transient 
performance-based art).29
 Generally, arts-focused cultural policy became a repetitive exercise 
in seeking different ways to ‘insert’ art into benign social policy contexts. A 
more compelling demonstration of the ‘power’ of art was arguably taking 
place in the urban realm, with local authorities and their various stakeholders. 
Many high profile artists, consultants or agents and architects developed 
public advocacy roles during this period, articulating a broader vision on the 
integration of art into the city. While they were also representing their own 
professional interests, the intellectual discourse generated in this sphere of 
things was significant and new.30  
 My point here then is that cultural policy, being focused on the arts, 
became overly concerned with the economics of arts funding and blind to 
the economics of cultural production (which is largely embedded in cities). 
While to some degree this reflects the territorialisation of the policy landscape 
(the ‘city’ is seen as local authority responsibility and not the preside of 
national arts funding bodies), there is a strong sense that vested interests 
alone are determining the role of art in the city and the fate of the real 
creative city ideal. The challenge of the Creative City framework was that it 
not only demanded art should be internal to the way a city plans its urban 
development, but that urban development itself should becomes generative 
of art. Conceptualising this process requires imagination, as we are currently 
working with a three-sphere economy of arts, culture and urban and no real 
strategic direction into a future other than a will to preserve and survival. 
Cultural policy does not have such an ‘imagination’ facility, but it needs to 
develop one given the possible scenarios of our developing era of scarcity.  
Thinking art in Urban Spaces
It’s easy to demand that ‘policy making’ develops an intellectual imagination: 
but what does this mean? I can only make one major point – cultural policy 
needs to develop out of an engagement with cultural production itself, out 
of the terms developed by artists and groups working in (and against) the 
actual concrete conditions of civic and urban life. In what follows below I 
offer six examples of ‘urban-public’ art practice, from which a general point 
on creative policy in the city can be extrapolated. 
 (i) The NVA organisation’s SAGE: the ‘Grow and Sow Project’ 
(starting in Glasgow 2009, ongoing in various permutations): NVA is one 
of the UK’s major public arts and urban intervention organizations, and the 
SAGE project’s stated aims include transforming derelict and vacant land 
into visually articulated spaces through growing natural produce and micro-
agricultural activity. The food is not for market as such, unless new local 
markets emerge around them; they seem to be primarily aimed at breaking 
the dichotomy of producer-consumer and is aimed at those who have no 
experience of growing garden produce. Framed by rising food costs and 
16
the globalization of the supply chain – this project is a powerful way of 
reconstituting community, identity and leisure (i.e. patterns of consumption) 
around urban land, perhaps unused, reclaimed, or politically contested. 
It has been designed as a mobile initiative – when land is required for 
development, the infrastructure can move to a new site. In some ways it 
bears some affinity with the Guerilla Gardening initiatives, or some projects 
on DIY City experiments.31 As an idea it is hardly new, given the use of old 
Victorian allotments during successive world wars. Its compelling aspect is 
in the recolonisation of space for a local economy, whose production values 
could be as social as cultural as political, if or when poverty levels ‘politicize’ 
the food chain.  
 (ii) Cittadellarte – Fondazione Pistoletto – is perhaps an example 
on an opposite pole. The 1960s art luminary Michelangelo Pistoletto is 
demonstrating a new form of creative entrepreneurship. While on the face 
of it, the Cittadellarte seems like classic high-cost urban regeneration in 
a celebrity-driven mode, yet this form of artistic patronage demonstrates 
profound intellectual potential. Artistic patronage or any other kind of artistic 
leadership in the UK is virtually non-existent. Called a ‘creative laboratory’, 
the Cittadellarte runs courses and convenes creative research teams to 
apprehend major social and economic problems, forging policy initiatives 
through artistic practice, whether urban decay or economic sustainability. 
While the ‘art lab’ idea was indeed a 1990s trend, this is far more – it is an 
industrial size complex that challenges university-based Humanities research 
in its potential for high-impact knowledge creation. Where most universities 
have largely abandoned a direct public role for their humanities research, 
this offers a measure of hope, particularly as Cittadellarte’s cultural activism 
has given the small town of Biella both a strong regional and a national 
profile. This kind of active cultural citizenship requires further thought. 
 (iii) Mirjam Struppek’s European Urban Screens are a low cost way of 
creating urban networks of information, art and cultural documentary. While 
the express attempt at using the virtual world of plasma screens to create 
the conditions of a new public sphere, is of course a little idealistic. Inserted 
screens in key public spaces is something that is gaining pace by commercial 
actors –and preventing this colonization of space is an achievement in 
itself. Theoretically, however, the screen could play a significant role in 
engaging with a culturally indifferent social populace on street-level. It could 
demonstrates a practical way of ‘externalizing’ artworld culture, creating 
perhaps (in Bourdieu’s terms) a new public ‘habitus’, which goes some way 
to helping dissolve the enduring cultural class system. I can also provide new 
methods of the politicization of public space, with its effective routes for the 
dissemination of political information.  
 (iv) CM Architecten’s Agorascape project is just one of many 
examples of contemporary European architects who draw on architectural 
history’s enormous intellectual resources, designing spaces for dialogue 
and interaction. Like the ancient Greek agora, or open ‘place of assembly’, 
this project aims at purposively designating civic spaces for the purpose of 
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discussion and debate. In cities, the places of political deliberation are closed, 
and enclosed, accessible only in badly tabulated documents well after the 
fact. Low cost modification of the environment can generate new ways of 
reinstituting an agora-culture in city centres. 
 (v) Faith groups have largely been written out of the narrative of 
cultural sector policy development, but they are one of the most productive 
of cultural groups. Take a provincial Baptist church on the edge of Oxford: 
the John Bunyan Baptist Church. Churches are surprising engines of cultural 
production, but the interesting dimension of this church is its Ark T Centre 
programme. Using an ajacent building, it creates a space for artists, and the 
art is used as a means of both ecclesiastical reflection as well as community 
dialogue between the artists and residents in the area. Despite the work of 
The Faith Based Regeneration Network and the various Interfaith Councils, 
the role of faith communities in regeneration has been largely stunted; their 
potential for a creative community mobilization, however, is enormous if 
allowed to work within the terms of their own sub-culture.  
 (vi) Participatory art: new forms of socially-embedded art are 
emerging, and in ways that have long term potential for urban development. 
Strange Cargo in Folkestone on the South Coast is one example of an 
organisation with a long-term political commitment to an urban locale. They 
find the means to adapt their artistic production to the broader rhythms of 
local cultural production. Here we find artists inhabiting regional vernacular 
culture for long periods, speaking the visual language of the area, working 
at providing an alternate method of constructing cultural capital to a 
populace always once-removed from ‘official’ culture. Strange Cargo are no 
art world snobs, but will participate in vernacular creativities from fetes to 
winter grottos. However, within the familiar and unthreatening world of the 
parochial everyday, they reorder the patterns of social interaction, which 
enable local people to learn, think, and access the discursive forces that 
ultimately shape their physical environment.    
 (vii) My last example is the most complex: Initially commissioned as 
part of the EuropeanCapital of Culture 2012 – awarded to the Ruhr region 
of Germany – the project 2-3Strassen began in 2009 when artist Jochen Gerz 
advertised around Europe for 80 volunteers to occupy, free of charge, 80 
apartments. Out of 1,457 applicants, 80 initially took up residence in each 
of the 3 streets, in Duisburg, Dortmund and Mülheim an der Ruhr (the latter 
is a ‘vertical street’ or towerblock and vicinity). Earmarked for ‘regeneration’, 
which a high immigrant population and unemployment, the ‘creatives’ were 
briefed on their creative terrain – in effect testing, but also working out, 
Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ thesis. Each street had an internet café and 
office space as an organizational HQ, and all apartments containing a laptop 
computer connected by internet to a central database. Contributing on their 
laptops, the resident creatives formed the core of authors that wrote the now 
published 3,000 word record: 2-3StrassenTEXT (Dumont, 2011).
 As a model of housing reclamation, residential enculturation and 
ethnic-immigrant acculturation, this art project opened up a new front for 
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art in the public realm. Many of the volunteers were artists or designers, 
many were not, and many continued to hold down their regular jobs. 
Together, the volunteer creatives lived in their streets from January to end 
of December 2010, 40 of which have remained. The objective for Gerz was 
to make the street a ‘living exhibition’ of art. With reference to Josef Beuys 
he sometimes called it ‘social art’. And as social art, it introduces a powerful 
sense of reorientation within a physical urban place. A year after the project’s 
termination, a new politics of public housing has been introduced into city 
policy circles.  
 My examples are, of course, atypical public-urban art projects, but 
chosen to present a spectrum of activities that need to be considered by 
policymakers in considering the relation between art, culture, city governance 
and urban development. The examples cover the active reclamation and 
reproduction of urban space, new intellectual centres for idea and policy 
development led by cultural ‘producers’, artists as facilitators of new public 
discourse through new media, explicit deliberations in designated city spaces, 
activating faith groups for dialogue of broader meaning, purpose and beliefs 
that motivate and provide hope, activating communities through creative 
participation, and addressing the chronic problem of housing in a way that 
generates restorative social energies. These are not unique projects, but 
together they give us a glimpse of the realms of urban life art could inhabit, 
which increased to a critical level of funding, would establish a critical mass 
of activity and in turn could become formative of a new city public culture. 
Once cultural activism reaches the level and consolidation of a truly ‘public’ 
cultural sphere, it then becomes political, as the ground on which it works, 
and the subjects through which it speaks, are replete with political interests. 
All our examples involve a mobilization of a public, or a process whereby art 
spectators are turned into cultural citizens. 
Conclusion
My intention in this paper, with a broad brush, has been to sketch a response 
to the current dissolution of the creative city model of cultural policy. This 
was not to glory in the demise of a fanciful ideology, but to recognize its 
significance in our thinking of the future of public culture after the large-scale 
umbrella of urban regeneration. How can we understand cultural production 
in the urban complex of the city without the patronage of capital investment? 
All my examples of art projects in urban spaces are animated by ideas that 
contrast with the priorities of urban regeneration. The role of artists in urban 
regeneration was always as a junior partner, and the art always submerged in 
a complex of symbolic meanings articulating global economic forces always 
beyond view. National cultural policy as it stands is fixation on international 
contemporary ‘artworld art’ – of effectively evangelizing on behalf of this 
artworld and attempting to convert the public into art spectators. It rather 
needs to consider how to turn art spectators into cultural citizens, whose life 
in real cities can be creative and generative of the non-capital investment 
social investment that is the only way to develop an urban ‘way of life’. It 
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needs to consider the real meaning of the term ‘public culture’, and how a 
genuine public culture can exist as an integral part of city governance. Of 
course, the opportunities will be (and are being) suppressed by a new public 
management ethos of ‘survivalism’, a retrenchment of self-interest, and a 
negation of risk. In the next decade – the ‘lost decade’, as the media are 
calling it – the most critical issues of the life of our cities will emerge. 
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